We consider the round complexity of multi-party computation in the presence of a static adversary who controls a majority of the parties. Here, n players wish to securely compute some functionality and up to n−1 of these players may be arbitrarily malicious. Previous protocols for this setting (when a broadcast channel is available) require O(n) rounds. We present two protocols with improved round complexity: The first assumes only the existence of trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems, and achieves round complexity O(log n) based on a proof scheduling technique of Chor and Rabin [13] ; the second requires a stronger hardness assumption (along with the non-black-box techniques of Barak [2] ) and achieves O(1) round complexity.
Introduction
Protocols for secure multi-party computation (mpc) allow a set of n parties to evaluate a joint function of their inputs such that the function is evaluated correctly and furthermore no information about any party's input -beyond what is leaked by the output of the function -is revealed (a formal definition is given in Section 2). Since the initial results showing that mpc was feasible [35, 25, 7, 12] , a number of works have focused on improving the efficiency of these protocols and in particular their round complexity (e.g., [1, 6, 30, 29, 22, 31, 15] ). Known results for generic mpc secure against malicious adversaries in the computational setting may be summarized as follows (results are stated for the setting when a broadcast channel is available; we discuss the setting without a broadcast channel in Section 5):
• Secure two-party computation may be achieved in a constant number of rounds by applying the compiler of Lindell [31] (based on earlier work of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [25] ) to the constant-round protocol of Yao [35] (which is secure against semi-honest adversaries).
• Secure mpc for honest majorities (i.e., when the number of corrupted players is strictly less than n/2) may be achieved in a constant number of rounds using the protocol of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [6, 34] .
• Secure mpc with dishonest majority (i.e., where up to n − 1 players may be corrupted) can be achieved in O(n) rounds using the protocols of Beaver, Goldwasser, and Levin [5, 27] . (Actually, these works show a protocol requiring O(k + n) rounds where k is the security parameter. Using the techniques of [31] , however, this may be improved to O(n).)
• Canetti, et al. [11] give a protocol tolerating adaptive adversaries controlling a dishonest majority in a model in which a common random string is assumed; the round complexity of this protocol depends on the depth of the circuit for the function being computed, but is independent of n.
Note that the setting with a dishonest majority (t ≥ n/2) requires a weaker variant of the usual definition of mpc. Even for the case n = 2, one cannot prevent the adversary from aborting the protocol, or from possibly learning information about the value of the function even when an abort occurs [25, 14] .
Our Results. We focus on improving the round complexity of mpc when a majority of the players may be corrupted. We show two protocols for that setting which have improved round complexity compared to previous work. Our first protocol assumes the existence of trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems, and achieves round complexity O(log n). Our second protocol runs in a constant number of rounds, but requires slightly stronger hardness assumptions as well as non-black-box proof techniques. We prove our results in the standard model of a synchronous, complete network with a broadcast channel. Our results can be extended to the setting when no broadcast channel is available, and give improved round complexity there as well; see Section 5. Our overall approach consists of two steps. We first consider the specific case of the coin flipping functionality, and give protocols for securely computing this functionality in the presence of a dishonest majority. We then note that mpc of arbitrary functions can be reduced to the problem of secure coin flipping; in fact, we show that any functionality can be computed in a constant number of rounds following an execution of a secure coin-flipping protocol.
Our main result, then, is to give two protocols with improved round complexity for the specific case of coin flipping. The first, based on a proof scheduling technique of Chor and Rabin [13] , requires O(log n) rounds. (Interestingly, the Chor-Rabin protocol itself does not seem sufficient to implement mpc; we need to first establish a common random string and then use that string for secure computation.) Our second coin-flipping protocol extends recent work of Barak [2] ; specifically, we show how to modify his (asynchronous) two-party non-malleable coin-flipping protocol to obtain one which is secure even when composed in parallel n times, and from there obtain a constant-round coin-flipping protocol which is secure in the (synchronous) multi-party setting. We may thus summarize our results as follows (here, n is the number of players, k is the security parameter, and we always assume a synchronous network with broadcast): Theorem 1. 1 . There exist protocols for (n − 1)-secure simulatable coin-flipping with the following properties: 1 . O(log n) rounds, assuming one-way permutations. 2 . O(1) rounds, assuming collision-free hashing, trapdoor permutations, and dense cryptosystems secure against 2 k -size circuits. The proof uses a non-black-box simulation.
Theorem 1.2. For any poly-time function f , there exist (n − 1)-secure protocols for computing f with the following properties:
1. O(log n) rounds, assuming trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems. 2 . O(1) rounds, assuming collision-free hashing, trapdoor permutations, and dense cryptosystems secure against 2 k -size circuits. The proof uses a non-black-box simulation.
Note that information-theoretically secure protocols are impossible in our setting: generic mpc protocols tolerating t ≥ n/2 imply the existence of two-party oblivious transfer protocols, which require computational assumptions [30] .
Organization of this paper. In Section 2 we specify our model and definition of mpc. Section 3 shows how to achieve coin flipping in logarithmic rounds; the constantround protocol is explained in Section 4. Section 5 shows how to achieve mpc for arbitrary functionalities given a protocol for secure coin flipping.
Definitions
Our definition of security for mpc is taken from the works of Canetti [8] and Goldwasser and Lindell [28] , which in turn follow a long line of work on defining security of protocols (e.g., [25, 27, 32, 4, 24] ). More recently, a stronger definition of universally composable (uc) computation has been proposed [9] ; however, uc-mpc is known to be impossible in the presence of a dishonest majority without the prior assumption of a common random string [10] . Since we wish to avoid a setup assumption of this form (indeed, we give explicit protocols for obtaining a common random string), we do not use the uc framework directly. Nonetheless, some of the protocols we use as building blocks were proven secure in the uc framework, a fact which highlights the utility of such definitions.
Network Model
Formal definitions of security are given below, but we provide an overview of our model and definition of security here. We consider a system of n parties who interact in a synchronous manner. Each pair of parties is connected by a perfect (authenticated, secret, unjammable) point-to-point channel, and we also assume a broadcast channel to which all players have access. This channel provides authenticity (i.e., that a given broadcast message originated from a particular party) and also ensures that all parties receive the same message even if the broadcasting party is dishonest. Messages sent on any of these channels are delivered in the same round they are sent.
We assume a static adversary who corrupts up to n − 1 of the players before execution of the protocol. The adversary is active, and corrupted parties may behave in an arbitrary manner. Although the adversary may not delay or block messages from honest parties, we do make the standard rushing assumption: i.e., the adversary sees all messages sent by honest players to corrupted players at a given round i (including broadcast messages) before sending its own messages for round i. Finally, we considercomputational security only and therefore restrict our attention to adversaries running in probabilistic, polynomial time.
Although we assume a broadcast channel, our techniques yield protocols with improved round complexity even when broadcast is not available (see Section 5).
Secure Multi-Party Computation and Coin-Flipping
Following the outline of [8, 28] , we define an ideal model of computation and a real model of computation, and require that any adversary in the real model can be emulated (in the specific sense described below) by an adversary in the ideal model. Our randomized function f to be computed by the n parties is denoted by f : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n where f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ); that is, for a vector of inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), the output is a vector of values (f 1 (x), . . . , f n (x)). Note that we may also view f as a deterministic function on n + 1 inputs, where the final input represents the random coins used in evaluating f . In a given execution of the protocol we assume that all inputs have length k, the security parameter.
Ideal model. In the ideal model there is a trusted party which computes the desired functionality based on the inputs handed to it by the players. Let I ⊂ [n] denote the set of players corrupted by the adversary. Then an execution in the ideal model proceeds as follows [24] (this particular definition is called secure computation with unanimous abort and no fairness in the taxonomy of [28] 
):
Inputs Each party i has input x i . We represent the vector of inputs by x.
Send inputs to trusted party Honest parties always send their inputs to the trusted party. Corrupted parties, on the other hand, may decide to abort or to send modified values to the trusted party. Let x denote the vector of inputs received by the trusted party.
Trusted party sends results to adversary If x is a valid input (i.e., no parties aborted in the previous round), the trusted party generates uniformly-distributed random coins, computes f (x ) = (y 1 , . . . , y n ), and sends y i to party P i for all i ∈ I. In case a party aborted in the previous round, the trusted party sends ⊥ to all parties.
Trusted party sends results to honest players The adversary, depending on its view up to this point, may decide to abort the protocol. In this case, the trusted party sends ⊥ to the honest players. Otherwise, the trusted party sends y i to party P i for each i / ∈ I.
Outputs An honest party P i always outputs the response y i it received from the trusted party. Corrupted parties output ⊥, by convention. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of its entire view throughout the execution of the protocol.
For a given adversary A, the execution of f in the ideal model on input x (denoted ideal f,A (x)) is defined as the vector of the outputs of the parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the process above.
Real model. As described in Section 2.1, we assume a synchronous network with rushing. Honest parties follow all instructions of the prescribed protocol, while corrupted parties are coordinated by a single adversary and may behave arbitrarily. At the conclusion of the protocol, honest parties compute their output as prescribed by the protocol, while corrupted parties output ⊥. Without loss of generality, we assume the adversary outputs exactly its entire view of the execution of the protocol. For a given adversary B and protocol Π for computing f , the execution of Π in the real model on input x (denoted real Π,B (x)) is defined as the vector of outputs of the parties along with the output of the adversary resulting from the above process.
Having defined these models, we now define what is meant by a secure protocol. (Note: By probabilistic polynomial time (ppt), we mean a probabilistic Turing machine with nonuniform advice whose running time is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter k. By expected probabilistic polynomial time (eppt), we mean a Turing machine whose expected running time is bounded by some polynomial, for all inputs.)
. Let f and Π be as above. Protocol Π is a t-secure protocol for computing f if for every ppt adversary A corrupting at most t players in the real model, there exists an eppt adversary S corrupting at most t players in the ideal model, such that:
As mentioned in the Introduction, our protocols for mpc proceed in the following way: First, a common random string is generated using a coin-flipping protocol; next, the resulting string is used by the parties for the remainder of their execution. Thus, using a simple composition result, we may construct our protocols for (n − 1)-secure mpc in two steps: (1) construct an (n − 1)-secure coin-flipping protocol (i.e., a protocol computing the functionality f (1 m , . . . , 1 m ) → U m , where U m denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1} m ); and (2) construct an (n − 1)-secure protocol for evaluating any functionality in the common random string model (i.e., where all parties are first given a uniformly-distributed string of the appropriate length).
Step (1) is discussed in Sections 3 and 4, and step (2) and the composition theorem are discussed in Section 5.
Since our main contributions are our protocols for coin flipping (achieving (n − 1)-secure mpc in the common random string model is relatively straightforward), and since the definition of security simplifies considerably in this case, we present a stand-alone definition here. Note that the definition does not reduce to the most simplistic notion of coin-flipping in which we simply have a guarantee that the output of the protocol is indistinguishable from random. Instead, it must be that a simulator can produce a view which is indistinguishable from that of the real adversary, but where the outcome has been forced to be a particular random string provided by an outside party. A related notion of simulatable bit-commitment was considered in [33] . Thus, we refer to the notion as "simulatable coin flipping" (even though this is precisely the same notion as (n − 1)-secure evaluation of the coin-flipping functionality).
Definition 2 (Simulatable Coin Flipping).
A protocol Π is a simulatable coin-flipping protocol if for every ppt adversary A corrupting at most n − 1 parties, there is an eppt machine S A such that the outcomes of the following experiments are computationally indistinguishable (as a function of k):
Here we parse the result of running protocol Π with adversary A (denoted real Π,A (1 k , 1 m )) as a pair (c, V iew A ) where c ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥} is the outcome and V iew A is the adversary's view of the computation.
For clarity, we encapsulate the preceding discussion here: Lemma 2.1. Simulatable coin-flipping (Definition 2) is equivalent to securely realizing the coin-flipping functionality for all t ≤ n − 1.
Simulatable Coin-Flipping in O(log n) Rounds
In order to construct a simulatable coin-flipping protocol, we will use a protocol in which all pairs of players can prove statements (in zero-knowledge) to each other. More precisely, suppose that each player P i has a (publicly known) statement x i and each honest player also has private input w i (where w i is a witness for x i ). We would like a protocol in which each player P i proves that x i is true (and that furthermore, P i knows a witness); upon completion of this protocol, all honest players should accept the result if and only if all players have successfully completed their proofs.
The naive approach to solving this problem is to have every (ordered) pair of players P i , P j simultaneously execute some constant-round zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in which P i proves knowledge of w i to P j . However, such an approach does not work (in general) due to the potential malleability of the proof system. Namely, it is possible that an adversary controlling P j could divert a proof being given to P j by P i and hence prove a false statement (or, at least, one for which P j does not explicitly know a witness) to P k . In particular, this is always possible without some mechanism to prevent simple copying of proofs.
An alternate approach -one taken by previous work in the case of dishonest majority [5, 27] -is to have each pair of parties execute their proofs sequentially over a total of n "stages" of the protocol. In stage i, player P i proves knowledge (in parallel) to all other players. This clearly avoids the malleability problem discussed above, but results in an O(n)-round protocol.
In fact, the issue of proof scheduling was previously dealt with by Chor and Rabin [13] in the context of mutually independent commitments. They proposed a scheduling strategy which results in a round complexity of O(log n). The scheduling guarantees that at any given time, no player is playing both the prover and the verifier. Moreover, every player eventually
denote the r = log n -bit binary representation of i.
Let (P, V ) denote a constant-round publicly verifiable, parallel-composable ZKAK.
1. For t = 1, ..., r = log n , repeat: O(n 2 ) pairs of proofs in parallel. (a) ∀i ∈ Blue t , j ∈ Red t : P i runs P (x i , w i ), P j runs V . (b) (After all proofs of (a) are finished) ∀i ∈ Blue t , j ∈ Red t : P j runs P (x j , w j ), P i runs V .
All messages are sent over the broadcast channel. If any proof between any pair of parties fails, all players abort immediately.
proves to every other player. This means that no matter what set of players is controlled by the adversary, he will eventually have to prove all his statements to some honest player. We present the Chor-Rabin (cr) scheduling strategy in Protocol 1.
To use cr scheduling in our context, we will require a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAK) which satisfies two additional properties (informally):
Public verifiability: A third party who views a transcript of an execution of the proof should be able to determine in polynomial time whether or not an honest verifier would have accepted.
Parallel composability In our application, n/2 copies of the proof system will be run synchronously and in parallel. We require the existence of: (1) a simulator that can simulate the view of a dishonest verifier executing n/2 copies of the proof system in parallel with independent provers; and (2) a witness extractor that can extract a witness for each proof from a malicious prover who is executing n/2 proofs in parallel with independent verifiers.
Although not all ZKAKs satisfy both the above properties [26] , the 5-round ZKAK of Feige and Shamir [19] (which only requires one-way functions) does. Chor and Rabin [13] proved that when the {x i } are commitments and the {w i } are the corresponding decommitments, their proof-scheduling technique guarantees mutually independent commitments. However, to use the protocol as a module in a larger protocol (i.e., as in a gmw-style compiler from the honest-but-curious model to the malicious model [25] ), a more sophisticated notion of security is necessary. Specifically, it is tempting to try to prove that cr scheduling realizes the ideal functionality of mutually independent proofs, that is, the functionality in which all players hand their pair (x i , w i ) to a trusted party who broadcasts only the list of players who supplied valid pairs.
It seems that the cr protocol does not satisfy this stronger property. Suppose the players use a malleable zk proof system for which it is possible, given access to a prover for either x 1 or x 2 , to prove knowledge of a witness for the statement x 1 ∨ x 2 . (Artificial examples of such systems can be constructed.
1 ) Consider an execution of the protocol for which only P 1 and P 2 are honest. Player P 3 is never proving to both P 1 and P 2 simultaneously-only ever to one or the other. Moreover, when P 3 is proving to P 1 , then P 2 is proving to some other corrupted player, and similarly when P 3 is proving to P 2 . Thus, P 3 could claim the statement x 1 ∨ x 2 without ever knowing an actual witness, and successfully pass all the proving stages.
Canetti, et al. [11] use a somewhat different ideal functionality as a basic step in the construction of multiparty protocols, namely a commit and prove functionality. We do not know of any way to prove that the cr scheduling protocol satisfies that definition, either.
Nevertheless, the cr scheduling protocol does satisfy very strong properties when the adversary controls all but one player, and this is sufficient for our purposes. The formulation of the property as it appears here is inspired by the notion of witness-extended emulation, due to Lindell [31] . Completeness: If all players are honest, and R(x i , w i ) = 1 for all i, then all players will accept the output of the protocol.
Simulatability: For a machine A, let A x,r denote the adversary with inputs x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) and random tape r.
There is a simulator S with inputs 1 k , x and oracle access to A x,r and two outputs: a protocol view V and a list of potential witnesses w = (w 1 , ..., w n ). For any ppt adversary A who controls all but one player P i , S is eppt and:
, the simulator's output is computationally indistinguishable from the view of A in an interaction with the honest
2. When the simulated transcript is accepting, the simulator is almost certain to extract a witness for x j , for all j = i:
Proof. Completeness of the protocol follows directly from the completeness of the ZKAK, and so we turn to simulatability. The proof follows the reasoning of [13] . Without loss of generality, say the adversary controls all players except P 1 . From the perspective of P 1 , the Chor-Rabin protocol is a sequence of 2 log n stages, where each stage consists of n/2 parallel executions of the ZKAK. In log n of these stages, P 1 is acting as the prover and in log n stages P 1 acts as a verifier. By parallel composability of the ZKAK, we immediately see that the simulator can always simulate the view of the adversary for those stages when P 1 acts as a 1 Consider the standard zk protocol for Graph Isomorphism of (G 0 , G 1 ). Prover sends H and then Verifier asks for the isomorphism H ↔ G b , for random b. The proof for (G 0 , G 1 ) ∨ (G 0 , G 1 ) works as follows: Prover sends H, H , Verifier replies with a bit b, and Prover shows isomorphisms H ↔ G b1 and H ↔ G b2 such that b = b 1 ⊕ b 2 . A cheating intermediary who has access to a prover for (
. A similar modification of Blum's Hamitonian Path proof system also works.
Protocol 2 (Simulatable coin flipping). On input 1
k , 1 m :
Invoke cr scheduling to show that ∀i, ∃(r i , s i ) such that c i = Commit(r i ; s i ). 4 . ∀i, P i sends r i . 5 . Invoke cr scheduling to show that ∀i, ∃s i such that c i = Commit(r i ; s i ). 6 . Output c = n i=1 r i , or ⊥ if any proofs failed.
All messages are sent over the broadcast channel.
prover. By the same token, in those stages when P 1 acts as a verifier (and assuming that all proofs given to P 1 by other players are successful), P 1 can extract witnesses for n/2 of the {x i } i =1 . That P 1 in fact extracts witnesses for all the {x i } i =1 follows from the fact that every other player acts as a prover to P 1 at some point in the protocol. We can combine these observations to form a simulator using the witness-extended emulation technique of Lindell [31] .
One way to understand the theorem above and its preceding discussion is that cr scheduling realizes mutally independent proofs when t = n − 1, but not necessarily for t ≤ n − 2. Viewed in that light, the following section proves that for coin-flipping, which is non-interactive and requires no private inputs, security for t = n − 1 is sufficient.
From Scheduled Proofs to Simulatable Coin-Flipping
To use cr scheduling for simulatable coin-flipping, we apply a technique due to Lindell [31] . Suppose that we have a non-interactive, perfectly binding commitment scheme (these can be constructed based on one-way permutations, for example). Players first commit to individual random coins and prove knowledge of the committed values. Next, they reveal the values (not the decommitment strings) and prove correctness of their decommitments. We give the resulting construction in Protocol 2. Note that primitives weaker than ZKAKs are sufficient: we may use strong witness-indistinguishable proofs of knowledge in the first phase, and zeroknowledge proofs (of membership) in the second phase. However, using these would make the protocol and proofs more cumbersome. Proof. (sketch) The simulator is given a value c and needs to simulate the view of an adversary who corrupts n − 1 players, while also ensuring that the final output of the protocol is c (we ignore for the present discussion the possibility of abort). Assume without loss of generality that the adversary corrupts all players except P 1 . The simulator begins by following steps 1 and 2 exactly, and committing to a random value r 1 . In step 3, the simulator may extract witnesses {(r j , s j )} j =1 by Lemma 3.1 (in this case, the simulator does not even need to be able to simulate the proofs of P 1 since it in fact has the necessary witness).
At this point, the simulator knows {r j } j =1 . It sets r 1 = c ⊕ n j=2 r j and sends r 1 in step 4. In step 5, the simulator can simulate (false) proofs that its commitment in step 1 was indeed a commitment to r 1 ; this follows from Lemma 3.1 (in fact, here the simulator no longer needs to extract any witnesses). These simulated proofs are computationally indistinguishable from "real" proofs, thus ensuring that the entire simulated protocol is computationally indistinguishable from an actual execution of the protocol.
Simulatable Coin Flipping in Constant Rounds
To obtain a constant-round coin-flipping protocol, we introduce a simple notion of parallel composability for two-party non-malleable coin-flipping protocols, and show that protocols satisfying this notion can be used to achieve multi-party coin-flipping. Although the recent two-party protocol of Barak [2] does not satisfy our notion of non-malleability, we show how to extend it so that it does.
Our resulting coin-flipping protocol is described in Protocol 3. As noted above, it relies on a modification of the coin-flipping protocol of Barak [2] which is described in Section 4.1 and is denoted by NMCF(1 k , 1 m ) for security parameter k and coin-length m. The protocol also uses an adaptively secure, unbounded-use non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (nizkpk) in Steps 4 and 5. De Santis and Persiano showed how to construct these based on dense cryptosystems (pkc) and trapdoor permutations [16] . 2 The use of n different strings to guarantee independence of non-interactive proofs is due to Gennaro [21] .
The completeness of Protocol 3 follows trivially from the completeness of the coin-flipping protocol and the nizkpk proof system. To prove the security of the protocol, we consider the effect of a coin-flipping protocol (A, B) in the following scenario. The adversary, C, simultaneously plays man-in-the-middle against with n pairs of copies of the protocol executed synchronously and in parallel (cf. Figure 1) . We call this an n-fold, parallel man-in-themiddle attack. It is a restriction of the more robust versions of non-malleability defined by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [17] , but it seems incomparable to that of Barak [2] .
Let r 1 , ..., r n be the outputs of the left-hand protocols, andr 1 , ...,r n be the outputs of the right-hand protocols. We clearly cannot prevent the adversary from mounting a trivial relaying attack, in which she copies messages from one or more protocols on the right to one or more protocols on the left. This allows the adversary to force the outcomes of some of the protocols to be identical. Instead, we require that the left-hand outputs r 1 , ..., r n all be random and independent, and that each of the right-hand outputsr i is either random and independent of the others, or equal to one of the left-hand outputs r j .
Definition 3.
A coin-flipping protocol Π = (A, B) is non-malleable against n-fold parallel composition if for any ppt algorithm C, there is an eppt algorithmĈ such that the following Protocol 3 (Constant-round simulatable coin flipping). Let R(c, (x, s)) denote the relation c = Commit(x; s), where Commit is a perfectly binding, non-interactive commitment scheme. Suppose that for security parameter k, the nizkpk system uses a crs of length = (k, m).
Run
2 n 2 protocols in parallel. For each ordered pair (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], i = j: Run coin-tossing protocol NMCF(1 k , 1 n ) (see Lemma 4.1) to generate a string of n coins which will be parsed as n strings σ (1)i,j , ..., σ (n) i,j ∈ {0, 1} . 2. P i : x i ← {0, 1} m 3. P i sends c i = Commit(x i , s i ) 4. P i sends, for j = 1, ..., n: nizkpk σ (i) i,j of (x i , s i ) such that R(c i , (x i , s i )).
P
All messages are sent over the broadcast channel. Honest players abort immediately if any nizkpk proofs fail. at random, and the output ofĈ(ρ 1 , ...ρ n , σ 1 , ...σ n ) consists of τ followed by a specification, for each i, of which value to assignρ i out of {σ i } ∪ {ρ 1 , ..., ρ n }.
It is not clear a priori that all non-malleable coin-flipping schemes satisfy this definition. In fact, it appears to be orthogonal to the definition of non-malleability in [2] : on one hand, it requires synchronous (not concurrent) execution of the 2n protocol pairs, and so a protocol which satisfies it may be insecure when any one of the executions is not synchronized. On the other hand, this definition requires security when the adversary has access to several protocols. In particular, if any of the building blocks of the coin-flipping protocol are not parallel-composable, then the resulting protocol may not satisfy the definition.
Lemma 4.1. The coin-flipping protocol of [2] can be modified to satisfy Definition 3.
We present the modified protocol in the following section. However, we first show that we can use it to obtain a constant-round simulatable coin-flipping protocol.
On input c ∈ {0, 1} m , the simulator does the following:
• Pick an honest player at random (w.l.o.g. P 1 ). Allow the adversary to control the remaining honest players. That is, wrap the original adversary A in a circuit A which makes the honest players follow the protocol. No special simulation of these players is required.
• Pick 2(n−1) strings ρ 2 , ..., ρ n , σ 2 , ..., σ n as follows. Recall that each string is parsed as n segments, each of which is long enough to serve for nizkpk. Use the nizkpk simulator to generate segment 1 of each string (independently), i.e. ρ
(1)
Use the nizkpk extractor to generate segments 2, .., n of each string, that is ρ
for all i and for j = 2, ..., n.
The simulator keeps the side-information necessary for simulation and extraction with respect to each of these strings.
• (Step 1) Run the simulatorĈ from (n − 1)-fold parallel composition on the adversary, on inputs ρ 2 , ..., ρ n , σ 2 , ..., σ n . Note that here, P 1 is playing the roles of A 1 , .., A n−1 and B 1 , ..., B n−1 . Denote the outputs of the coin flipping protocol by σ 1,j and σ j,1 for j = 2, ..., n, as in Protocol 3.
• (Steps 2, 3 and 4) Run these steps honestly: choose x 1 ← {0, 1} m , pick coins s 1 , let c 1 = Commit(x 1 ; s 1 ) and prove knowledge of x 1 using nizkpk.
• Extract the values x 2 , ..., x n from the proofs at Step 4 (this is possible since the values used by other players were all generated by the extractor for the nizkpk). Compute x = c ⊕ n j=2 x j .
• (Step 5) Send x . For each j = 2, ..., n, use the simulator for the nizkpk to fake proofs of "∃s such that R(c 1 , (x , s ))" with respect to σ
1,j .
• Either the protocol aborts, or all honest players output the string x ⊕ n j=2 x j = c.
Protocol 4 (Parallel NM coin flipping (NMCF(1 k , 1 m ))). Steps L0.1.x, R0.1.x (Left commits to α): Left party chooses a hash function h 1 , and sends h 1 and y 1 = Com(h 1 (0 k )). It then proves using a PSWIUAK that it knows a value α of length at most k log k such that y 1 = Com(h 1 (α)).
Steps L0.2.x, R0.2.x (Right commits to β): Left party chooses a hash function h 2 , and sends h 2 and y 2 = Com(h 2 (0 k )). It then proves using a PSWIUAK that it knows a value β of length at most k log k such that y 1 = Com(h 1 (β)).
Step L1 (Commitment to r 1 ): Left party selects r 1 ← {0, 1} m and commits to it using a perfectly binding commitment scheme. The commitment is denoted α 1 . Steps L2.2-L2.4,R2.1-R2.3 (Prove knowledge of r 1 ): The left party proves to the right party its knowledge of the value r 1 committed by α 1 using a P SW IP OK.
Step R3 (Send r 2 ): The right party selects r 2 ← {0, 1} m and sends it.
Step L4 (Send r) The left party sends r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 .
(No decommitment string is revealed).
Steps L5.1-5.9, R5.2-R5.10 (Prove that r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 ): The left party proves, using a PZKUAK, that either r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 or r ∈ R α β,k , where {R ·,· } is an n-evasive set family.
The proof of the success of this simulation relies on several observations. First, the strings output by the generators are pseudo-random, and so the behaviors of the adversary and simulator are the same as if the strings were truly random. By Lemma 4.1, the simulation of the NMCF protocols is indistinguishable from a real execution, and the strings generated will, with overwhelming probability, be from {ρ 2 , ..., ρ n , σ 2 , ..., σ n }.
Second, as observed by Barak [2] , nizk proof of knowledge systems remain secure even if the adversary may choose the crs from among a polynomial set of random (or pseudorandom) strings. The adversary will not be able to make his committed values (in Step 3) dependent on those of the honest players, since that would violate the hiding property of the commitment or the zero-knowledge property of the proof system (in fact, all we need here is strong witness indistinguishability). Moreover, the simulator will be able to extract the committed values of the cheater since the adversary proves with respect to the strings generated by the extractor. Finally, the simulator's proof of consistency of his decommitment will appear legitimate, again because of the zero-knowledge property, and the adversary's proofs will have to remain sound. Remark 1. The use of nizkpk in the above protocol requires a dense pkc. We expect that one can avoid this assumption by using (non-malleable) interactive zk proofs of knowledge which rely on a public random string. We defer details to the final version.
Parallel Composability of Barak's Coin-Flipping Protocol
The material of this section appears in much greater detail in Appendix A.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is similar to the proofs of Theorems 2.4 and 3.4 in [2] . There are two main modifications to Barak's protocol which are necessary. First, the two proof systems that are used as sub-protocols must themselves be parallel composable. This is trivial for the strong witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge. As for the zk universal argument, the original paper of Barak and Goldreich [3] gives a construction which is concurrently composable and thus parallel composable.
Second, the evasive set family that is used in the proof of security must resist generation of an element by ppt ccircuits, even when n strings from the family are given (here n is the number of players and not the security parameter). By changing the union bound in the proof of existence of evasive set families ( [2] , Theorem 3.2), it is possible to show the existence of sets which remain evasive given n elements, provided that we increase the security parameter appropriately.
The remainder of this section contains the definitions necessary to state the NMCF protocol (Protocol 4). The notation used in the protocol definition is taken from [2] for consistency. Note that here PZKUAK (resp. PSWIUAK) refers to a parallel composable universal argument of knowledge which is also zero-knowledge (PZKUAK) or witness-indistinguishable (PSWIUAK). These can be constructed based on trapdoor permutations and collision-free hash families secure against 2 k -size circuits [3] . The conditions on the set family {R ·,· } in the protocol appear below.
Definition 4 (n-Evasive Set Family).
Let n = n(k) = k c for some constant c > 0. An ensemble of sets {R α,k } α∈{0,1} * ,k∈N , where R α,k ∈ {0, 1} k is said to be an n(k)-evasive set family if the following conditions hold with respect to some negligible function µ(·):
Constructibility: For any k ∈ N, and any string α ∈ {0, 1} * , the set R α,k can be constructed in time |α|2 k 3 . That is, there exists a TM M R such that M (1 k , 1 n ) runs in time |α|2
and outputs all the elements of R α,k .
Pseudorandomness: For all probabilistic 2 O(k) -time Turing Machines M , and for all α ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that
n-Evasiveness: Given n elements of R α,k , it is hard for algorithms with advice α to find an (n + 1)-st element: for all probabilistic 2 O(k) -time Turing Machines M , and for any with respect to a prg G) . Let G be a prg from t bits to g(t) bits secure against algorithms which take time o(g(t)). Let φ( ) be any integer function such that < φ( ) < 2 . Consider two strings α, α ∈ {0, 1} * and let = |α| + |α |. The strings α, α are φ-equivalent with respect to G if there exist φ( )-time Turing machines M and M which can each be described in space log( ), and such that
Definition 5 (String Equivalence
where the second input to M, M denotes a random tape, and t = g −1 (φ( )).
Lemma 4.3.
Suppose that G is a pseudo-random generator from t bits to 2 t bits. Let φ( ) = 2 log 2/ ( ) . There exists an n-evasive set family for all n(k) ≤ k /2 , with the additional property that if α and α have length at most , and are φ-equivalent with respect to G, then
Proposition 4. 4 . Suppose that 2 k -strong trapdoor permutations and hash families exist and that {R α,k } is an n-evasive set family as in Lemma 4.3. Then NMCF (Protocol 4) is non-malleable against n-fold parallel composition.
Multi-Party Computation
In this section we show how to obtain mpc protocols for arbitrary functionalities using any simulatable coin-flipping protocol. Let a fixed-round protocol be one which always requires the same number of rounds in every execution; we only discuss fixed-round protocols for poly-time computable functions f . Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [6] (with further extensions in [34] ) shows that:
Theorem 5.1 ( [6, 34] ). Suppose that trapdoor permutations exist. For any function f , there is an O(1)-round protocol for computing f which is (n − 1)-secure against honestbut-curious adversaries.
For malicious adversaries, Canetti, et al. [11] construct mpc protocols in the common random string (crs) model which are (n − 1)-secure against adaptive adversaries (in fact, their protocols achieve the stronger notion of universal composability). Because their goal is security against adaptive adversaries, the round complexity of their protocols is proportional to the depth of the circuit being evaluated. Nonetheless, many of the tools they develop (such as uc commitment and zero-knowledge proofs) run in constant rounds. The following result for the case of static adversaries is not explicit in [11] , but follows directly from their work (we use the expression abortable mpc to emphasize that in our setting the adversary may abort the protocol):
Theorem 5.2 ([11]).
Given an r-round protocol for mpc of a function f which is (n − 1)-secure against static, honest-but-curious adversaries, there is an abortable mpc protocol for f with O(r) rounds which is (n − 1)-secure against static, malicious adversaries in the common random string model, assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations and dense pkc. Combining the two previous theorems, we obtain: Corollary 5. 3 . Suppose that trapdoor permutations and dense pkc exist. For any function f , there is an O(1)-round (abortable) protocol for computing f in the crs model which is (n − 1)-secure against static, malicious adversaries.
The key to using simulatable coin-flipping protocols in our setting -when no setup assumptions are made and a crs is unavailable -is the following composition result: Proposition 5. 4 . Given a simulatable coin-flipping protocol ρ, and an abortable protocol π for computing f in the crs model which is (n−1)-secure against static, malicious adversaries, the natural composition of the two is a protocol for computing f with no setup assumptions which is (n − 1)-secure against static, malicious adversaries.
Canetti [8] proved a much more general composition result of this sort for the case of non-abortable mpc protocols. In fact, however, his proof applies in our context more or less directly. Since our particular composition result is considerably simpler, we provide a proof sketch here.
Proof. (sketch) Let state A denote the internal view of A at the end of the round in which the coin-flipping protocol ρ terminates (call this round r). We may imagine the adversary A as the composition of two adversaries: A 1 operates for r rounds and produces output state A . A 2 takes as input state A , operates for the remainder of the protocol and produces the final view view A . We can now invoke the security of the coin-flipping protocol ρ to create a simulator S 1 which takes a string σ ∈ {0, 1} m as input and outputs variables σ , state A such that σ ∈ {σ, ⊥} (with overwhelming probability) and state A c ≡ state A when σ is indistinguishable from random.
We may now define an adversary A 2 for the crs model as follows: upon receiving σ from the trusted party, run S 1 to produce σ , state A . If σ = ⊥, then broadcast "I abort" and halt. Otherwise, run A 2 on input state A to complete the protocol. Note that an execution of A 2 in the ideal model can be modified to yield a view and protocol outputs which are indistinguishable from those generated by A in the real model. 4 Finally, we invoke the security of π to obtain a simulator S 2 for the ideal model which emulates the behavior of A 2 . The output of the simulator S 2 can be similarly modified to yield outputs indistinguishable from those of A in the real model. Removing the broadcast channel assumption Although we assume a broadcast channel, our techniques yield protocols with improved round complexity even when broadcast is not available.
Suppose that all players are connected by secure channels. Then assuming a pre-existing public-key infrastructure (PKI), one can build an O(t)-round authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol (where up to t < n players are dishonest) [18] . If one is willing to allow the possiblity of aborting the setup, one can in fact establish a PKI from scratch in O(t) rounds [20] . Using that, Fitzi et al. [20] sketch a transformation from any r round mpc protocol (with abort) in the broadcast model to an O(r + t)-round protocol which doesn't assume such a channel. Note that for any r = O(n) this yields linear complexity, so there is no need to invoke our protocols which require stronger complexity assumptions. We obtain: Corollary 5.5. For any poly-time function f , there exists a (n − 1)-secure protocol for computing f in a synchronous network ( without broadcast) which runs in O(n) rounds, assuming trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems. [28] (independently of [20] ) considered a further relaxation of mpc in which some honest players may abort while others complete the protocol successfully (those who complete the protcol are nonetheless guaranteed a correct result). This relaxation, called designated abort since the adversary may choose which players abort, allows much greater efficiency. Any r-round (abortable) mpc protocol secure in the broadcast model can be transformed into a mpc protocol which doesn't assume a broadcast channel and runs in O(r) rounds [28] . Thus: Corollary 5. 6 . For any poly-time function f , there exist (n − 1)-secure protocols for computing f in a synchronous network without broadcast and with designated abort with the following properties:
Goldwasser and Lindell
Constructibility: For any k ∈ N, the set R k can be constructed in time 2 k 3 . That is, there exists a TM M R such that M (1 k , 1 n ) runs in time 2 k 3 and outputs all the elements of R k .
Pseudorandomness: For all probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machines
n-Evasiveness: Given n elements of R k , it is hard for ppt algorithms to find an (n + 1)-st element: for all probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machines M , and for any
According to this definition, Barak's original notion would be called 1-evasiveness.
Lemma A. 1 . Suppose that 2 k -strong one-way functions exist. Then there exists a n-evasive set for all n(k) ≤ k /2 .
Proof. The proof of this is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2 in [2] , and we have attempted to keep it syntactically close to the original. We sketch it here for completeness. We will work with an intermediate security parameter
t /2 , and let µ(t) = f (t) −1/3 . Note that µ(·) is negligible. Suppose that we choose a random subset S ∈ {0, 1} k with f (t) elements. We will show that S is pseudorandom and evasive with high probability. We need only prove that these two properties hold against Turing machines of size log t and running time t log t since we are interested, for now, only in uniform adversaries. Denote the set of such machines by M t . Note that |M t | ≤ t.
Pseudorandomness: By the Chernoff inequality, for any Turing machine M , the probability (over the choice of S) that
is very low (at most 2 −Θ(f (t) 1/3 ) ). Thus, with overwhelming probability, S is pseudorandom for all machines in M t .
Evasiveness: For any fixed n strings α 1 , ..., α n ∈ {0, 1} k , and for any Turing machine M , the probability that M (α 1 , ..., α n ) hits a random string α ∈ {0, 1} k is 2 −k . Thus, the expecta-
k . By the Markov inequality, the probability over choice of
Taking a union bound over all sets of n strings and all machines in M t , we get that the set S satisfies n-evasiveness with probability at least
, and n ≤ √ t, the probability of evasiveness is overwhelming (roughly 1 − 2 k 1− ). Constructibility: Under our assumptions, there exists a generator G : {0, 1} t → {0, 1}
2 Ω(t )
such that for any randomized circuit C of at most size T = 2 Ω(t ) , Pr r ∈ {0, 1} T : C(r) − Pr s ∈ {0, 1} t : C(G(s)) ≤ 1/T (see, e.g. [23] , page 85).
Given a particular candidate set S ∪ {0, 1} k of size f (k), we can use the prg to verify in deterministic time 2 2t that S satisfies pseudorandomness and evasiveness: For a fixed machine M ∈ M t , we can use the generator on a t-bit seed to evaluate the quantity Pr[r ← S : M (r) = 1] − Pr[r ← {0, 1} k : M (r) = 1] to within precision 2 −Ω(t ) , which is much smaller than µ(t). There are 2 t seeds to search, and so the whole test runs in time 2 2t−1 . Similarly, for each choice of n strings α 1 , ..., α n ∈ S, one can search through all seeds of length t to evaluate Pr[M (α 1 , ...α n ) ∈ S \ {α 1 , ...α n }]. Each such test takes time 2 t · f (t) · poly(k), and so testing evasiveness requires f (t) n+1 · 2 t · poly(k) < 2 2t−1 steps. The total time for pseudrandomness and evasiveness is at most 2 2t . We can now use the prg to find a set S satisfying the test above, by applying the prg to a log(ck)-bit seed. This fools tests which run in time 2 Θ((ck) ) , which is greater than 2 2t for large enough constant c. Searching through all such seeds exhaustively yields a 2 O(k) < 2 k 3 time deterministic algorithm for constructing an n-evasive set.
Remark 2. The diagonalization in the previous proof applies even if we consider machines with longer running time than k log k -it would even be reasonable to consider machines with running time up to 2 O(k) . This observation will be useful for handling non-uniform adversaries.
A.2 Proof of Security for Uniform Adversaries
The N M CF protocol for uniform adversaries is described in Protocol 5. The protocol is identical to the original from [2] , except for two changes:
1. We replace the evasive set with an n-evasive set.
2. The strong witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge and the zero-knowledge universal argument are replaced by parallel composable versions of the same primitives (denoted PSWIPOK and PZKUAK).
Proposition A.2 (Uniform adversaries).
Protocol N M CF unif orm satisfies Definition 3 against Turing machines (specifically, adversaries with at most log k bits of advice).
Proof. Consider 2n parallel, synchronous executions of Protocol 5, with the adversary playing the right party in half of the executions, and the left party in the other half, as in Figure 1 . We can view these as two synchronized executions of a single protocol, which itself consists of n parallel executions of N M CF unif orm . This new protocol has the same structure as Barak's original protocol, and the same proof applies ([2], Theorem 2.4). The only difference is that in the original proof, Barak obtains a contradiction by producing a polynomial time machine which violates the evasiveness property of the set R k (denoted R n in [2] ). In our case, the same argument produces a machine which, on input r 1 , ..., r n ∈ R k , producesr ∈ R k \ {r 1 , ..., r n } with non-negligible probability, thus violating the n-evasiveness property of R k .
We give a proof sketch here, but refer the reader to [2] for details.
Main simulator: The first step, given an adversary C, is to produce a simulator for the view of C. The simulator gets inputs ρ 1 , ..., ρ n , σ 1 , ...σ n , and outputs a simulated view. The simulatorĈ is described in Figure 2 . Step L1 (Commitment to r 1 ): Left party selects r 1 ← {0, 1} m and commits to it using a perfectly binding commitment scheme.
The commitment is denoted α 1 . Step R3 (Send r 2 ): The right party selects r 2 ← {0, 1} m and sends it. The left party proves, using a parallel zero-knowledge UKARG that either r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 or r ∈ R k , where R k comes from an n-evasive set.
⇒
It is straightforward to show that the output ofĈ is indistinguishable for that of C, and that r i = ρ i for each i. We still need to show that with high probability, for each i ∈ [n], eitherr i = σ i (equivalently:r i =r 1,i ⊕r 2,i ) orr i ∈ {ρ 1 , ..., ρ n }. We say the simulatorĈ is broken if this condition is not satisfied.
Secondary simulator:
In order to prove this, we construct another machineĈ with total running time 2 k whose output is indistinguishable from that ofĈ and hence from the view of C in a real execution. A schematic description ofĈ appears in Figure 3 . Note that in the figure, the notation r refers to the vector of strings r = (r 1 , ..., r n ). Similarly for r 1 ,r, σ, etc.
C behaves like the simulatorĈ , with one difference: in Step L4, the simulated party L constructs R k and sends n random members of R k . Correspondingly, instead of simulating the universal argument, it now runs the honest prover algorithm (total time 2 O(k 3 ) , by the prover efficiency condition of universal arguments).
In the output ofĈ , each of the strings r 1 , ..., r n is in R k . Moreover, if the simulatorĈ is broken with non-negligible probability, then with non-negligible probability, there exists some j ∈ [n] such that the following all hold simultaneously: 1.r(j) ∈ {r 1 , ..., r n } 2.r(j) =r 1 (j) ⊕r 2 (j). 3 . The proof that eitherr(j) =r 1 (j) ⊕r 2 (j) orr(j) ∈ R k passes verification. Now the soundness property of the PZKUAK holds against 2 k 5 -time adversaries, and so, in particular, the statement proved by C in the last step of the simulation run byĈ must be true (note that no rewinding occurs during the PZKUAK). Now suppose we halt the execution ofĈ at the point wherer is computed. Up to this point,Ĉ would need only a polynomial number of steps, if r 1 , ..., r n ∈ R k were provided by some outside source. This means that we have a ppt algorithm that violates the n-evasiveness property of R k . Hence, the simulatorĈ is never broken with non-negligible probability, and so Definition 3 is satisfied.
Input toĈ :
Simulator algorithmĈ (polynomial time) for uniform adversaries.
A.3 Evasive Families for Non-Uniform Adversaries
For non-uniform adversaries, we extend the definition of evasive sets to include pseudorandomness and evasiveness against Turing machines that receive a particular string α as advice. Moreover, the time these Turing machines may take is exponential in k, instead of simply polynomial. Moreover, in the proof we will diagonalize against machines with a super-logarithmic (but sub-polynomial) description size. This will be useful below.
Definition 7 (n-Evasive Set Family). Let n = n(k) = k c for some constant c > 0. An ensemble of sets {R α,k } α∈{0,1} * ,k∈N , where R α,k ∈ {0, 1} k is said to be an n(k)-evasive set family if the following conditions hold with respect to some negligible function µ(·):
Pseudorandomness: For all probabilistic 2 O(k) -time Turing Machines M , and for all α ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that Pr[r ← R α,k : M (α, r) (r 1,1 , ..., r 1 
) for unifrom adversaries n-Evasiveness: Given n elements of R α,k , it is hard for algorithms with advice α to find an (n + 1)-st element: for all probabilistic 2 O(k) -time Turing Machines M , and for any
As in [2] , diagonalizing against machines with advice α is no harder than diagonalizing against machines with no advice. Lemma A. 3 . Suppose that 2 k -strong one-way functions exist. Then there exists a n-evasive set family for all n(k) ≤ k /2 .
A.3.1 Equivalent Advice Strings.
Remark 3. The details in this section are based on Barak's original proof, as elaborated in personal communication.
We will need an additional property from the evasive set families for the proof: it should be that if a string α can be generated from a string α in polynomial time, then the set collections {R α,k } k∈N and {R α ,k } k∈N should be equal. Unfortunately, this is tricky to make precise and so instead we defines a slightly looser notion of equivalence which captures the informal one.
Definition 8 (String Equivalence). Consider two strings α, α ∈ {0, 1} * and let = |α|+ |α |. The strings α, α are φ(·)-equivalent for some function φ( ) (typically, super-polynomial and sub-exponential) if there exist φ( )-time Turing machines M and M which can each be described in space log( ), and such that
For the purposes of this proof, we will always use φ( ) = 2 This modified construction algorithm has essentially the same running time as the original (that is, it remains 2 O(k) ). Moreover, it trivially guarantees that R α,k = R α ,k for all k ≥ 2 √ log when α and α are equivalent. We must still prove that the new set family satisfies pseudorandomness and evasiveness. Suppose that there is a 2 k -time machine M described by log k bits with advice α. We would like to describe an equivalent machine M which uses advice α instead. Let M α,α be the TM of description size log that transforms α into α with probability at least 1/φ( ). Given the machine M α,α , the string α and the generator G, there are at most φ( ) possibilities for α, and hence we could specify α using only log φ( ) additional bits. This means that we can construct a new machine M which behaves identically to M , but which has description size log k + logφ( ) < 2 √ log k and which takes α instead of α as advice. The machine M also takes an additional φ( ) steps, but this is much less than 2 k , so the total time remains under 2 k+1 . The diagonalization used to construct R α tolerates machines with this advice and running time. Thus pseudorandomness and evasiveness hold for M and for M .
A.4 Security Against Non-uniform Adversaries
As above, the N M CF protocol for non-uniform adversaries (Protocol 6) is identical to Barak's original protocol, except that we use a n-evasive set family, and the proof systems are instantiated with parallel-composable protocols. Note that PSWIUAK here refers to a strong witness-indistinguishable universal argument of knowledge [3] . Proposition A. 6 . Protocol N M CF (Protocol 6) satisfies Definition 3.
Proof. The general outline of this proof is the same as for Proposition A.2. For any adversary (circuit family) C, we first construct a simulatorĈ , described in Figure 4 . As above, thê C produces a view which is computationally indistinguishable from a real execution, and ensures that r 1,i ⊕ r 2,i = ρ i andr 1,i ⊕r 2,i = σ i . The difficulty is to prove that with high probability the right-hand execution will produce outputsr i ∈ {σ i } ∪ {ρ 1 , ...., ρ n }.
For this we construct a secondary simulatorĈ ( Figure 5 ). 1 . The simulated honest parties L, R actually commit to the description of the adversary desc(C) instead of the dummy value 0 k (that is, α i =β i = desc(C) for all i).
2.
The simulated honest parties require poly(k log k ) random coins in order to commit to and prove knowledge of α i andβ i . They obtain these coins by running a generator G mapping t bits into 2 t bits on input seeds of length O(log 2/ k).
3.
The simulator also rewinds C to extract its committed valuesα i and β i (these strings may be up to k log k bits long). Finally,Ĉ constructs the sets Rα i β i ,k and selects r i ← Rα i β i ,k . Note that none of the proofs performed byĈ need to be simulatedthe statements are always true.
The total time taken byĈ is 2 O(k 3 ) . The same argument as for uniform adversaries shows that if C can break the main simulationĈ with non-negligible probability-that is, ifr i ∈ {σ i } ∪ {ρ 1 , ...., ρ n }-then with Steps L,R0.1.x (Left commits to α): Left party chooses a hash function h 1 , and sends h 1 and y 1 = Com(h 1 (0 k )). It then proves using a PSWIUAK that it knows a value α of length at most k log k such that y 1 = Com(h 1 (α)). The left party proves to the right party its knowledge of the value r 1 committed by α 1 using a P SW IP OK.
PSWIPOK of r 1 ⇒
Step R3 (Send r 2 ): The right party selects r 2 ← {0, 1} m and sends it. The left party proves, using a parallel zero-knowledge UKARG that either r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 or r ∈ R α β,k , where R α β,k comes from an n-evasive set family. PZKUAK r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 or r ∈ R α β,k . ⇒ non-negligible probability,Ĉ produces an accepting view such thatr i ∈ {σ i } ∪ {ρ 1 , ...., ρ n }, but nonethelessr i ∈ Rα i β i ,k . We claim this contradicts the n-evasiveness property. One can obtain each of the strings α i β i andα i β i from the string desc(C) as follows: first guess the seeds s,s used by L and R, then simulate L, R and C using those coins, and run the extractor for the PSWIUAK to extractα and β. This procedure takes time poly(k log k ) by the extraction properties of the PSWIUAK. Since the seeds used by L, R have log 2/ (k) bits, the whole procedure succeeds with probability 2 −O(log 2/ k) . Hence, the strings α i β i andα i β i are φ-equivalent with respect to G, and thus R α i β i ,k = Rα i β i ,k . Hence, any adversary C which breaks the simulatorĈ implies the existence of a machine which breaks the evasiveness property of the set family R ·,· . 
